



MPA

EMEA

KNOW YOUR BUSINESS CUSTOMER:

How commercial operators of illegal sites evade detection, and how to fix it.

October 2020

THE TARGETS: PIRATE CYBERLOCKERS

Openload

Cyberlocker used by 90%+ of linking piracy websites

- Main domain receives

AVG 200M visitors/month

- Rank 224 Globally
- Top 407 in the US

Streamango


- AVG 38M visitors/month

- Top 2023 Globally
- 2359 in the US

Rapidvideo

- AVG 54M visitors per month
- 1243 Globally and 170 in Indonesia (2188 US)

 United States	11.31%
 Italy	6.88%
 India	5.26%
 Germany	4.71%
 Japan	4.26%
 United States	14.26%
 India	7.94%
 France	7.89%
 Spain	7.38%
 Italy	6.14%
 Indonesia	12.49%
 Turkey	7.66%
 United States	7.47%
 Philippines	4.61%
 Malaysia	4.60%



OPENLOAD IS LISTED BY THE EU AND US



*Openload*⁴⁵

Openload is one of the most popular streaming cyberlockers worldwide reportedly offering unauthorised copies of films, TV shows, books and music. The hosting provider of the website is not revealed by a service provider registered in the US. The website incentivises users to upload large, popular files by paying a fixed reward per 10,000 downloads or streams. The total number of visits of *Openload.co* between April 2017 and March 2018 was around 3,2 billion. The average rank worldwide was 267. 37% of the visits came from the EU, 63% from non-EU countries.



OPENLOAD.CO

Also **oload.tv** directs to **openload.co**.

This very popular steaming and download cyberlocker incentivizes users to upload large files, such as television episodes and movies, by allegedly paying a fixed reward per 10,000 downloads/streams, with higher rewards for downloads by users in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The site reportedly claims that the files it hosts “will never be deleted, especially if somebody is downloading them.” Right holders report that the website is being masked behind a reverse proxy service, allegedly to curb right holders’ ability to identify its precise host.



GLOBAL VIDEO STREAMING TRAFFIC SHARE

- 1 HTTP MEDIA STREAM
23.8% ↓
- 2 NETFLIX
23.1% ↓
- 3 YOUTUBE
12.7% ↓
- 4 OPERATOR IPTV
10.0% ↓
- 5 FACEBOOK VIDEO
5.0% ↓
- 6 AMAZON PRIME
4.3% ↓
- 7 TWITCH
4.2% ↓
- 8 TIK TOK
3.4% ↓
- 9 OPENLOAD
2.4% ↓
- 10 DAILY MOTION
1.3% ↓



SANDVINE


The Global Internet Phenomena Report September 2019

The surprise entrant from last year, Openload, is still on this list, and is actually a higher percentage of overall video traffic than last year. This is the most popular Kodi provider that we see worldwide, and reflects the growing popularity of IPTV piracy.



THE HOST

- All three of these cyberlockers use the same host.
- A global hyper-scale cloud provider located in France.
- One of the most important hosting companies in the EU, with over **300,000 servers** and **28 datacenters** across **19 countries** hosting **18 million web applications** for **1,300,000 customers**.



THE COURT ORDER

Giovanna CRAPPEO *revenue* **ORDONNANCE**

Nous, ^{l'adjointe} présidente du Tribunal de Grande Instance de LILLE,

Vu la requête qui précède (et son annexe) et les pièces à l'appui,

ORDONNONS :

à la société [REDACTED] de communiquer aux Requérants tous les éléments permettant l'identification de la (des) personne(s) ayant contribué à la création du contenu ou de l'un des contenus sur les Services et faisant ou ayant fait usage le 18 août 2019 de l'une des Adresses IP [REDACTED] annexées à la Requête aux fins de rendre lesdits contenus/Services accessibles (notamment via les noms de domaine www.openload.co, www.streamango.com, www.rapidvideo.com) par la création d'un compte et/ou en vertu d'un contrat d'hébergement conclu avec [REDACTED], et notamment :

[Host] is ordered to communicate
“...*all elements permitting identification of the persons who contributed to the creation...*”

Le 28 août 2019



FOLLOW THE MONEY

- Host has received **more than € 19M** to host these three illegal services, according to data disclosed pursuant to the court order.
- Bills for Openload and Streamango were paid by the Paypal account of a Costa Rican advertising company, or by untraceable credit cards.



THE MONEY LEADS TO...?

Listed customer for Openload is a **defunct** Hong Kong shell entity that ceased to exist in 2016.

Name:	Yin	Firstname:	Yu
Organisation: (S)	Openload Ltd		
(S: corporation (société); A: association; P: individual; autre: other)			
Adress:	Xuannishi Road No.250, Zhuoneng Square 7th Floor		
Zip:	0000	City:	Hong Kong
Department:		Country:	HONG-KONG
Language		English	
<hr/>			
Phone:	+86.15555665681	Fax:	
E-mail:	admin@openload.io		
TVA:	(empty)	SIRET:	



SO, HOST.... WHO IS YOUR REAL CUSTOMER?

Host admits it **does not know** the identity of a customer from whom it has received millions of euros.

Ensuite, et concernant vos demandes :

* Les données communiquées par notre client sont purement déclaratives. [redacted] ne détient donc aucun élément permettant d'en vérifier l'authenticité.

* S'agissant des autres personnes mentionnées dans les logs, vous l'aurez bien compris, il s'agit de salariés [redacted].

* S'agissant des paiements, nous ne sommes pas en mesure de vous en fournir l'intégralité dès lors qu'ils portent sur plusieurs milliers de factures dont l'extraction serait trop lourde pour nos infrastructures.

Vous trouverez cependant l'intégralité des factures émises pour chacun de ces clients en pièce jointe.

* Pour ce qui est des coordonnées bancaires, elles sont tronquées volontairement en application des dispositions légales applicables et [redacted] ne dispose pas de cette information.

* Lorsque nous n'avons pas indiqué les références de paiement, c'est que nous n'en disposons pas.

Vous remerciant pour votre compréhension,

Salutations distinguées,

"The data communicated by our client are purely declarative. [Host] therefore does not possess any element permitting verification of authenticity."

[redacted]
Juriste éthique et conformité

département juridique [redacted]



AND JUST A FEW WEEKS AGO...

A hosting provider in Germany cautioned us ...

Alle Angaben wurden vom Kunden gemacht und sind nicht auf Richtigkeit von uns überprüft.

“All information was provided by the customer and has not been checked for accuracy by us.”



THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED EXAMPLE...

The Netherlands is a hub for EU hosting and domain name service providers... accepting fake customer data like “nowhere lane” “idontknowstreet” “anonymous” “12345678” “unknown” “Admin”...

Van: [REDACTED]
Datum: Thu, 8 Sep 2011 17:05:11 +0200
Aan: [REDACTED]
Onderwerp: RE: NAW-verzoek www.ond-films.com/ (IP 85.17.206.212)

Hi Pieter,

Het IP staat opnaam van:

Raf Mouss
Nergenslaan 11
1512KL Amsterdam

Email from [REDACTED] a Dutch hosting provider, about pirate site ond-films.com

Domain name: nlsubtitle.nl
Status: active

Registrant:
YAN001608-TRAIP
Yanbodesign
Anoniem 123, 1234AB Anoniem,
+31.612345678
anoniem@anoniem.nl

Domain Name: FULL-STREAM.NET

Registration Date: 27-Sep-2012
Expiration Date: 27-Sep-2014

Status: ACTIVE

Name Servers:

eva.ns.cloudflare.com
greg.ns.cloudflare.com

Registrant Contact Details:

I
E (a@b ws)
O
I ??
I
I, O
RU
Tel. +33.000000000

Registrant:
Admin, Server
Onbekende 1,

Registrant Address: ikveetnietstraat
Registrant City: nergensloo



NO CUSTOMER = NO CASE

- Illegal websites rely on multiple mainstream service providers such as hosting, payment, advertising, proxy providers (Cloudflare) and domain name providers
- These intermediaries are making millions from fraudulent business customers who give unverified data.
- **This epidemic of fraudulent operators makes it exceedingly difficult to bring civil or criminal actions to stop online harms.**
- It also renders useless the E-Commerce regulation requiring all online businesses to provide their name, physical address, and contact details.
- **This is not just a piracy issue:** All illegal sites hide their identity, including scams, malware, illegal gambling, child exploitation...



THE SOLUTION: KYBC

- The EU Legislators should intervene to require that intermediaries providing commercial services to online businesses to implement a **“Know Your Business Customer” (KYBC)** protocol in line with Art. 5 ECD.
- These are routine due diligence measures for verifying identity on the basis of validated documents, data or information (such as VAT registration or other sufficient proof of identity).
- It is easy for any legitimate business to comply, but difficult for criminals.
- Where the customer identity is shown to be fake, the service provider should be required to terminate the service.

